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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Niles Brad Harlow appeals from the judgment of conviction entered by the district
court upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of methamphetamine. On
appeal Harlow argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
At approximately 2:00 a.m., Deputy Hale saw a red Ford Ranger pull off a main
road and onto a little side street and park near a semi-trailer that had its back open.
(2/9/17 Tr., p. 8, L. 10 – p. 10, L. 23.) The semi-trailer was “blacked out.” (Id.) Deputy
Hale was concerned that a theft may be about to occur, so he turned around and parked
about 20-25 feet from the red Ford Ranger. (Id.) The red Ford had its lights off and it
was dark, so Deputy Hale activated his spotlight. (Id.) Deputy Hale did not activate his
overhead lights. (Id.)
Deputy Hale walked to the passenger side of the red Ford and asked the driver,
later identified as Harlow, if everything was okay. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 11, L. 17 – p. 12, L. 1.)
Harlow said “he was having vehicle problems or the vehicle was smoking.” (Id.) Deputy
Hale thought that was odd since he did not smell any smoke and he did not see any
problems when the Ford was driving. (Id.)
Deputy Hale started to walk around to the driver’s side. (2/7/17 Tr., p. 12, L. 16 –
p. 13, L. 21.) As Deputy Hale was walking around, Harlow exited the red Ford very
quickly and was standing by the time Deputy Hale made it around the corner of the
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vehicle. (Id.) Deputy Hale then saw, on the ground between the driver’s side door and
the tire, a baggie that appeared to be methamphetamine. (Id.)
Deputy Hale told Harlow to keep his hands where he could see them and Harlow
became defensive.

(2/9/17 Tr., p. 13, L. 22 – p. 14, L. 19.)

Harlow denied the

methamphetamine on the ground was his. (Id.) Deputy Hale instructed Harlow to walk
to his vehicle and sit on the bumper while Deputy Hale called for an officer assist. (Id.)
Harlow appeared agitated and defensive. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 3-16.) He was also
speaking very fast. (Id.) Once the assist officer arrived, Deputy Hale detained Harlow by
placing him in handcuffs for everyone’s safety. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 14, L. 20 – p. 16, L. 1.)
Deputy Hale told Harlow “you’re being detained.” (2/9/17 Tr., p. 15, L. 17 – p. 16, L. 1.)
Deputy Hale did not place Harlow under arrest. (Id.)
Deputy Hale searched Harlow’s vehicle after the assist officer’s drug dog alerted
on it. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 2-12.) During this time, Deputy Hale did not place Harlow
in the back of the patrol car. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 10-16.) Harlow remained in the area
near the front of Deputy Hale’s patrol car. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 10-16, p. 26, Ls. 17-19.)
After searching the car, Deputy Hale came back and told Harlow that he knew that
the methamphetamine was his, but that Harlow had “options.” (2/9/17 Tr., p. 16, L. 22 –
p. 19, L. 20.) If Harlow was willing to work as a confidential informant then they would
write a report and see if the detectives were willing to work with him. (Id.) Harlow
indicated that he was willing to work with the detectives. (Id.)
Deputy Hale removed the handcuffs. (Id.) Deputy Hale then again asked Harlow
whether the methamphetamine was his, and Harlow “shook his head yes.” (Id.) Deputy
2

Hale and Harlow had a long discussion about Harlow’s drug problem and how Harlow
had recently fallen off the wagon. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 18, L. 25 – p. 19, L. 10.) Deputy Hale
empathized with Harlow and understood the struggles Harlow was going through. (Id.)
Deputy Hale told Harlow about the struggles his own family had had with
methamphetamine. (Id.)
Deputy Hale felt that Harlow was under the influence so he did not want to let
him drive, so Deputy Hale asked Harlow if he wanted a ride home. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 23, L.
1 – p. 24, L. 14.) Harlow agreed. (Id.) Harlow rode in the back of Deputy Hale’s patrol
car and he did not wear handcuffs. (Id.) Harlow wanted to be driven to his sister’s
apartment so Deputy Hale dropped Harlow off at his sister’s apartment. (Id.)
Harlow never made contact with the detectives to see if he could work as a
confidential informant. (2/28/17 Tr., p. 215, Ls. 3-10.) The state eventually charged
Harlow with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp. 41-42.)
Harlow filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp. 54-60.) Harlow argued that his
incriminating admission should be suppressed because he claimed he was in custody
when he made the admission and Officer Hale did not give Miranda 1 warnings. (See id.)
The state responded. (R., pp. 69-76.) The district court held a hearing and Deputy Hale
testified. (R., p. 77.)
Deputy Hale testified that he parked far enough behind Harlow’s vehicle so that
Harlow would have been able to drive away. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 10, Ls. 1-10.) Deputy Hale’s
patrol car did not block Harlow’s vehicle. (Id.) Deputy Hale testified that, after Harlow
1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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quickly got out of the vehicle, Deputy Hale saw the baggie of methamphetamine on the
ground. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 12, L. 16 – p. 13, L. 21.) He testified that Harlow appeared
agitated and was acting very defensive and speaking very fast, so he detained Harlow in
handcuffs for everyone’s safety. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 15, Ls. 3-16.) Deputy Hale did not place
Harlow under arrest. (Id.)
By the time Harlow acknowledged the methamphetamine as his, Deputy Hale had
already told Harlow that he was not going to jail. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 21, L. 19 – p. 22, L. 25.)
Deputy Hale also testified that he had removed the handcuffs before Harlow admitted the
methamphetamine was his. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 18, L. 18 – p. 19, L. 10.)
The district court entered a written Memorandum Decision and Order denying
Harlow’s motion to suppress. (R., pp. 83-91.) The district court found the testimony of
Deputy Hale to be “credible and reliable.” (R., p. 83.) The state conceded that the
incriminating admission was elicited via an interrogation; therefore, the only issue was
whether Harlow was in custody. (See R., p. 86, n. 5.) The district court applied the law
to the facts and found “[t]he examination of the record did not reveal circumstances under
which a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would believe that, at the time of the
confession, he was formally arrested or that his freedom of movement was restrained to
the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (R., pp. 86-89.) The district court made the
factual finding that Deputy Hale had removed the handcuffs before engaging in the
interrogation that elicited the incriminating response. (See R., p. 85.) The district court
found that Harlow did not carry his burden to prove he was in custody at the time he
confessed to the ownership of the methamphetamine. (R., p. 89.)
4

The case proceeded to jury trial. The jury found Harlow guilty of possession of
methamphetamine. (R., p. 126; 2/28/17 Tr., p. 263, L. 12 – p. 264, L. 5.) The district
court entered judgment and sentenced Harlow to six years with two years fixed. (R., pp.
128-134; 4/24/17 Tr., p. 275, L. 9 – p. 280, L. 13.) The district court suspended the
sentence and placed Harlow on probation. (Id.) Harlow timely appealed. (R., pp. 142145.)

5

ISSUE
Harlow states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Harlow’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Harlow failed to show the district court erred when it determined that Harlow
was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda and denied his motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Determined That Harlow Was Not In Custody
When He Made The Incriminating Admission
A.

Introduction
Deputy Hale had removed Harlow’s handcuffs and informed Harlow that he was

not going to jail before Harlow made the incriminating admission. (See R., pp. 88-89.)
The district court correctly found that Harlow had not met his burden to show he was in
custody and, therefore, Deputy Hale was not required to read Miranda warnings prior to
eliciting the incriminating admission. On appeal Harlow has failed to show the district
court erred. The district court properly considered the applicable factors and correctly
applied the law to the facts.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on

a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of
fact which are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 186 P.3d
696 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286
(Ct. App. 1996)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err Because Harlow Failed To Carry His Burden To
Show He Was In Custody When He Admitted To Owning The Methamphetamine
After

Deputy

Hale

removed

the

handcuffs,

Harlow

admitted

the

methamphetamine belonged to him. (2/9/17 Tr., p. 18, L. 18 – p. 19, L. 10.) The district
7

court found, based on all of the circumstances, that Harlow failed to meet his burden to
show he was in custody at the time he made the incriminating admission and denied
Harlow’s motion to suppress. (See R., pp. 83-89.) On appeal Harlow disagrees with the
district court’s application of the law to the facts. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8.)
Harlow contends that a reasonable person in Harlow’s position would have understood
that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with formal arrest.
(See id.) Harlow’s appellate argument fails. The district court correctly ruled that
Harlow’s freedom of movement was not restrained to the degree associated with formal
arrest and, thus, Miranda warnings were not required.
“The requirement for Miranda warnings is triggered by custodial interrogation.”
State v. Beck, 157 Idaho 402, 407, 336 P.3d 809, 814 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing State v.
Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992)). “The United States
Supreme Court equated custody with a person being deprived of his or her freedom by the
authorities in any significant way.” Id. at 408, 336 P.3d at 815 (citing Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966)). “This test has evolved to define custody as a
situation where a person’s freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with
formal arrest.” Id. (citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984); State v.
Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 610, 798 P.2d 453, 455 (Ct. App. 1990)).

“The initial

determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not
on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being
questioned.”

Id. (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994)).

To

determine whether a suspect is in custody, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable
8

person in the suspect’s position would have understood his or her situation.” Id. (citing
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 (1984); Myers, 118 Idaho at 611, 798 P.2d at 456). “A court
must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.”

Id. (citing

Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322; State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172
(2010)). The Idaho Court of Appeals laid out possible factors to be considered:
Factors to be considered may include the degree of restraint on the
person’s freedom of movement (including whether the person is placed in
handcuffs), whether the subject is informed that the detention is more than
temporary, the location and visibility of the interrogation, whether other
individuals were present, the number of questions asked, the duration of
the interrogation or detention, the time of the interrogation, the number of
officers present, the number of officers involved in the interrogation, the
conduct of the officers, and the nature and manner of the questioning.
Id. (citing Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441-442; James, 148 Idaho at 577-578, 225 P.3d at
1172-1173). “The burden of showing custody rests on the defendant seeking to exclude
evidence based on a failure to administer Miranda warnings.” Id. (citing James, 148
Idaho at 577, 225 P.3d at 1172).
Here the district court properly considered the appropriate factors and determined
that Harlow was not in custody at the time he made the incriminating admission. The
district court found that Harlow was not in handcuffs when he made the incriminating
admission. (See R., pp. 88-89.) Further, Harlow was not informed that the detention was
more than temporary. (See id.) Deputy Hale informed Harlow that he was only being
detained and that he would not be arrested that night. (See id.) The location of the
interrogation was not a police dominated environment, as there was only Deputy Hale
present and a sergeant “close-by.” (See id.) The district court held:

9

Here, the encounter occurred in a small parking area on the
shoulder of a public roadway in the early morning hours. Initially, only
Deputy Hale and Defendant were present. Deputy Hale’s spotlight
illuminated the Ford, but his patrol car lights were not activated. He
initiated the encounter with Defendant in a non-threatening manner,
simply asking if “everything was okay.” Defendant exited the Ford on his
own accord; he was not ordered out of the car, nor were weapons drawn.
The detention occurred after Deputy Hale saw the baggie of
methamphetamine on the ground by Defendant’s feet, when he instructed
Defendant to keep his hands behind his back, walked him to the rear of the
Ford, and patted him down for weapons. Due to Defendant’s agitation,
Deputy Hale placed him in handcuffs while awaiting the arrival of the
canine unit and had him stand by Deputy Hale’s patrol car. Deputy Hale
removed the handcuffs after Defendant agreed to speak further with
detectives about providing information to detectives as a confidential
informant. Importantly, at the time Defendant confessed to ownership of
the drugs, he was not in handcuffs. He was alone with Deputy Hale,
although Deputy Hale’s sergeant was close by. The canine officer had
either “cleared” or was not in the immediate vicinity. It was not a policedominated environment. Additionally, Deputy Hale specifically informed
Defendant prior to the confession that he would not arrest him that night.
(R., pp. 88.) The district court properly considered the applicable factors.
Harlow argues that the encounter became custodial when Deputy Hale told
Harlow that he had enough information to arrest him. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-8.)
Harlow’s argument fails for both legal and factual reasons. First, “the threat of lawful
arrest alone does not transform non-custodial questioning into the functional equivalent
of arrest, requiring Miranda warnings.” James, 148 Idaho at 578, 225 P.3d at 1173; see
also State v. Silver, 155 Idaho 29, 32-33, 304 P.3d 304, 307-308 (Ct. App. 2013). Thus,
the district court correctly found Deputy Hale telling Harlow that he had enough
information to lawfully arrest him did not create a custodial situation. (See R., p. 88.)
In addition, the district court found that Deputy Hale told Harlow that he would
not be arresting him that night. (R., p. 88; see also 2/9/17 Tr., p. 21, L. 19 – p. 22, L. 25.)
10

The district court found, “Deputy Hale specifically informed Defendant prior to the
confession that he would not arrest him that night.” (R., p. 88.) Thus by the time Harlow
made the incriminating admission there was no threat to arrest. The district court did not
err when it determined that Harlow was not in custody when he made the incriminating
admission. The district court’s summation is correct:
In sum, Defendant has not carried his burden to establish that he was in
custody at the time he confessed to ownership of the drugs. The
examination of the record did not reveal circumstances under which a
reasonable person in Defendant’s position would believe that, at the time
of the confession, he was formally arrested or that his freedom of
movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.
Consequently, his motion to suppress is denied.
(R., p. 89.)
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 30th day of March, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 30th day of March, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an electronic copy
to:
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson____________________
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
TST/dd
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